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I. THE FAITH OF CHRIST—AND FAITH IN THE SPIRIT 
       In the first essay, we noted the equivocation in Wright’s thought as 
to when and how God savingly “vindicates” fallen human beings.  One 
kind of “vindication” is the initial “status” granted to us within the 
people of God. The other kind of “vindication” is our resurrection to 
eternal life. Between the two stands a gap that somehow must be bridged. 
A similar form of equivocation appears in Wright’s understanding of 
faith. On the one hand, Wright is able to speak in relatively traditional 
Protestant terms of Abraham’s faith as “the sign of a genuine humanity, 
responding out of total human weakness and helplessness to the grace 
and power of God.”1 On the other hand, he immediately follows this 
description of faith with the assertion that God is not an “existentialist” 
who wants an “authentic” response rather than an “external” one. Faith, 
“indicates the presence of genuine, humble, trusting, and indeed we 
might say image-bearing humanity” (p. 209). Here again Wright’s moral 
idealism expresses itself, as becomes apparent in his following statement: 
“And, within that, ‘faithfulness’ has all along (so it seems) been the thing 
that God requires from his people.” The divine plan “has been fulfilled 
by the Messiah’s faithfulness (pistis),” so that “the badge of the covenant 
people from then on will be the same: pistis, faith, confessing that Jesus 
1 N. T. Wright, Justification: God’s Plan and Paul’s Vision (Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2009), 209. 
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is Lord . . . .”2 Despite some ambiguity in Wright’s language, his 
understanding of faith here becomes fairly clear. “Faith” for Wright 
serves as a “sign,” “emblem,” or “badge” of another, more fundamental 
reality. Furthermore, as an external sign, faith includes the faithfulness 
manifest in the Messiah, indeed, the obedience that God has required 
from his people all along. The badge of the covenant people is the same
as the faithfulness of the Messiah who fulfilled the divine purpose (p. 
209). Again, while there may be some confusion here—at the very least 
there is ambiguity—Wright openly states his basic concern. He wants to 
exclude the thought that faith might be a merely internal act, a view that 
he quite naturally associates with Bultmannian existentialism.3 What then 
is the relationship between “faith” and “faithfulness” according to 
Wright?4 Confusion arises because of Wright’s suggestion that the badge 
of faith is the same as the faithfulness of the Messiah. Is faith then to be 
equated with faithfulness? And if “faith” is to be equated with 
“faithfulness,” shall we say that we are “justified by faithfulness”? How 
much “faithfulness” is necessary for us to be justified at the final 
judgment? Wright plays with reformational questions, apparently without 
realizing it. Does the tension Wright seeks to maintain between the 
individual and the corporate, traditional doctrine and personal 
innovation, confuse him—or does he intentionally equivocate? It is hard 
to see the difference between Wright’s correlation of “faith” and 
“faithfulness” and the Thomistic and Tridentine distinction between 
2 Ibid. On the interpretation of the debated expression pistis Christou, I am 
persuaded that both the objective genitive (“faith in Christ”) and the subjective 
genitive (“faith/faithfulness of Christ”), favored by Wright, miss the mark. The 
expression is best understood as containing a genitive of source or possession: 
Paul speaks of the faith that comes from Christ. See Mark A. Seifrid, “The Faith 
of Christ,” The Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, Biblical, and Theological 
Studies (ed. Michael F. Bird and Preston M. Sprinkle; Milton Keynes, UK: 
Paternoster, 2009/Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2010), 129–46. 
3 Does Wright imagine that all Protestant theology that does not follow his 
line of thought is somehow unconsciously Bultmannian? That would be a 
strange charge—and impossible to sustain. 
4 At this point Wright’s thought parallels that of Barth, who likewise 
introduces confusion into the concept of faith by suggesting that the twofold 
usage of the term pistis shows that in faith we have to do with an imitatio Christi
as an imitation of God (Church Dogmatics IV/1, 634-637). Nevertheless, Barth 
makes a distinction between the judgment of God and the life of the Christian, 
between “the center” and “the circumference” of faith (CD IV/1, 618), between 
unqualified justification and our correspondence to Christ (CD IV/1, 645-636). 
Wright blurs this distinction by making “justification” the mere starting point of 
salvation.
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“unformed faith” (fides informis) and the “faith formed by love” (fides
caritate formata) that finally saves. If faith itself is to serve as an emblem 
or badge, it must be thought to consist in something outward, like the 
verbal confession of Christ or becoming a member of a church or, more 
importantly for Wright, doing outward, visible good. As significant as 
these actions may be, it is hard to see them as the sum and substance of 
faith, or certain marks of its genuineness. “Faith” is not an outward 
badge, but an unseen reality that manifests itself in our works, as is 
apparent in the well-known challenge of the Jacobean interlocutor: 
“Show me your faith without works, and I shall show you faith by my 
works!” (Jas 2:18b).5 We must not forget, moreover, that the true nature 
of our “works” will become evident only at the final judgment. Prior to 
that judgment, outwardly good works remain ambiguous: only when our 
persons become manifest before the judgment seat of Christ will it 
become clear whether or not these works are in reality what they appear 
to be outwardly (2 Cor 5:10). The work of the Spirit is not without 
outward effect, but the work itself remains hidden until the Last Day. 
The sheep at the right hand of the throne of the Son of Man remain 
unaware of the good they have done (Matt 25:37-39). The hidden Jew 
receives praise, not from people, but from God (Rom 2:29). Not even the 
apostle Paul is ready to pass judgment on himself and his work before 
the Last Day (1 Cor 4:1-5). It is the risen Lord alone—with eyes as a 
flame of fire—who knows and exposes the works of his churches (Rev 
2:2, 19; 3:1, 8, 15). Faith is the hidden source of all good works, the 
secret power that makes them good rather than self-serving: “everything 
that does not proceed from faith is sin” (Rom 14:23). To make “faith” 
into an outward emblem is to rob it of its vitality. 
It is in the vision of Jesus the Messiah, in whom the faithfulness that 
God required of Israel has come to reality, that Wright binds “faith” to 
“faithfulness.” Here, as we have noted, lies the heart of Wright’s 
program: the image of God and of true humanity had to be embodied in 
human life, a calling at which Israel failed.6 In seeing Jesus our 
representative, we see the true God and what it means to be truly human.
In seeing him we are transformed by the power of the Spirit. As we 
observed in the previous lecture, Wright thereby renders Jesus generic 
and thus de-historicizes him. Here, again, is a remarkable irony! 
Although Wright valiantly, and in many ways brilliantly, defends the 
5 James does not call his readers to examine their works in retrospect, but to 
engage in the works of a living faith! 
6 Wright, Paul in Fresh Perspective, 70.  See Mark A. Seifrid, “The 
Narrative of Scripture and Justification by Faith: A Fresh Response  to N.T. 
Wright,” CTQ 72.1 (2008): 28–34.
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historicity of the Gospels and of Jesus’ resurrection, in his attempt to 
combat Bultmann’s existentialism, he falls into the very problems that 
are fundamental to it. The earth, it turns out, is round. The great distance 
that separates Wright and Bultmann serves in the end only to bring them 
together: “consistent eschatology” in existential mode meets “realized 
eschatology” in Wright’s modification of it.7 Bultmann carries out his 
program of de-mythologizing the New Testament by distinguishing 
between the natural and the historical. He sets apart the world that is 
accessible to human investigation from the “historical,” namely, that 
which calls the human being to authentic decision. He, thus, no longer 
sees the world as creation and transposes all God’s works, including the 
cross and resurrection of Christ, to the inward life and existence of the 
human being.8 Wright does the opposite. Where Bultmann internalizes,
Wright externalizes. As we have seen, “faith” for Wright is finally 
faithfulness, the outward and visible expression of being truly human, the 
doing of the will of God, sharing in the covenant faithfulness of God 
manifest in the obedience of Jesus. As the true human being who is our 
representative, Jesus remains distant and generic. Otherwise, in what 
Reinhold Niebuhr calls, “genuine prophetic Christianity” the “moral 
qualities of Christ” would be “not only our hope, but our despair.”9 In a 
way that is remarkably reminiscent of Bultmann, Wright insists on the 
particularity of Jesus, but cannot, so far as I can see, provide a 
substantive reason as to why Jesus alone should be the representative of 
God’s faithfulness. Could not the saints fill this role? Why, moreover, 
must this faithfulness be bound to Israel’s story? Why not a Gandhi? In 
this de-historicizing interpretation of Jesus, Wright likewise misses the 
work of the Creator, who gives himself to us in Jesus and in him makes 
us into a new creation. As we have seen in the first essay, for Wright it is 
first and foremost Jesus’ obedience unto death that saves us, and not his 
death itself. We do not meet Jesus in “wondrous exchange” as he has 
come down into the depths of our misery and sin. Indeed, for Wright 
Jesus does not come down to us. We must first come up to him. Much 
7 In his interpretation of Jesus’ parables and apocalyptic, Wright clearly 
stands in the interpretive tradition of C. H. Dodd—and yet reacts against it by 
attempting to draw a straight line from the present age into the age to come.  See 
C. H. Dodd, The Parables of the Kingdom (New York: Scribner’s, 1961), 20–84, 
157–69.
8 See Oswald Bayer’s important critique of Bultmann, which unfortunately 
does not appear in English translation, Theologie (Handbuch systematischer 
Theologie 1; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlag, 1994), 475–84. 
9 R. Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York: World, 
Meridian 1956), 73. 
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like Bultmann, then, Wright turns “faith” into a moral demand. Neither 
of them has a taste for the cross as the “great pleasure of our existence.”10
Of course, their differences remain. While Bultmann understands “faith” 
as the call to authentic decision, Wright understands “faith” as the call to 
authentic action. Paul, in contrast to both of them, understands faith as 
the new creation, Christ present within the heart through the Gospel: “I 
no longer live, but Christ lives in me. What I live . . . , I live by the faith 
of [i.e. given by] the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself up for 
me” (Gal 2:20).11
In Wright’s program, then, a gap stands between us and Jesus. With 
that gap the pressing question arises: Is it possible to trust in Jesus, if we 
regard him first and foremost as the representative bearer of the divine 
image? Wright himself has difficulty in doing so and, thus, speaks of 
trusting in the Spirit, who transforms us into that divine image that Jesus 
embodies (pp. 107, 188). Jesus appears for Wright primarily as the 
manifestation of a moral ideal—a moral ideal to which we cannot of 
ourselves attain. The Spirit therefore necessarily becomes the object of 
faith alongside Jesus. No longer does the Spirit do anything other than 
make known the mysterious cross-words of Jesus (John 14:15-21, 25-26; 
15:26-27; 16:7-15). No longer does the Spirit come as a polemicist who 
wages war against the world and the flesh (John 16:8-11; Gal 5:17).12 No 
longer is the presence of the Spirit the life of the resurrection given to 
faith here and now (Rom 8:1-11). No longer does Christ come to us and 
dwell in us by the Spirit (“I will not leave you as orphans, I will come to 
you”; John 14:18; cf. Rom 8:9-10). Rather than bringing Christ down to 
us, the Spirit must lift us up to Christ, and that in a nearly mystical 
manner. The Spirit is thus robbed of the task of communicating Christ 
and his benefits through the Gospel, and must instead bring unnamed 
benefits of his own. “Faith” consequently becomes divided and diffused 
in Wright’s program. Wright appeals to the creeds in support of his 
urging that we should place our trust in the Spirit, and thereby confuses 
the content of faith (fides quae creditur) with the act of believing (fides
qua creditur). If, following Wright’s appeal to the creed, we place our 
10 We have already pointed to this reflection of Johann Georg Hamann.  See 
Bayer, Theologie, 479; Oswald Bayer and Christian Knudsen, Kreuz und Kritik. 
Johann Georg Hamanns Letztes Blatt: Text und Interpretation (BHT 66; 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1983), 111. 
11 On “faith of Christ” as a genitive of source see Seifrid, “Faith of Christ,” 
in Bird and Sprinkle, Faith of Jesus Christ, 129–46. 
12 See Ernst Käsemann, Perspectives on Paul (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 
1971), 71. 
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trust in the Spirit, shall we then not also place our trust in the Church?13
Indeed, above all else with Wright, confusion remains as to where we 
should place our trust. In what measure shall we place our trust in God’s 
work in Jesus? In what measure shall we place our trust in God’s work in 
us by the Spirit? 
II. THE LAW, GUILT, AND THE FORGIVENESS OF SINS 
      As with “faith” and “justification,” there is an inconsistency within 
Wright’s thought as to whether or not the law serves merely to keep sin 
in check or to expose human guilt. This uncertainty on his part entails an 
underestimation of the reality of guilt and its effects. One of the reasons 
that Wright has such difficulty in understanding the law in Scripture is 
that he fails to see that the law is not the cause of our fallen condition, 
but the means by which it is brought to light. This condemning work is 
not a misuse of the law, as Wright—in line with a Barthian approach—
seems to say at one point.14 According to Scripture, it is a fundamental 
purpose of the law (e.g. Rom 4:15; Gal 3:12, 19-22; 2 Cor 3:6). There is 
a large difference between the reality of our guilt, and the small measure 
of it of which we are aware. Most of us do not live with a tormented 
conscience. It is the hearing of the demands of the law from without—
often through the voice of another—that reveals to us the reality of sin 
and guilt that is present in our hearts. The encounter with the law is no 
mere moment of intellectual illumination. It is a deadly engagement in 
which our whole person is captured afresh by sin and brought into guilt.  
The “knowledge of sin” that comes through the law is an experiential 
knowledge: tragically, all of us know both the reality and guilt of 
coveting (Rom 3:19-20; 7:7-13). In this concrete and personal way, as 
Paul says, “through the commandment sin becomes utterly sinful.” In the 
face of the law’s demands, we find ourselves simultaneously guilty and 
powerless. The commandment, which we and all human beings agree is 
“holy, righteous and good,” exposes our desire to do away with the God 
who gives the commandment and to take for ourselves that which 
belongs to our neighbor. Unable to remove from our heart either our 
recognition of the good or the reality of evil, we live in the constant need 
to justify ourselves and our life. We no longer are able to see the world 
13 The Apostolic Creed: Credo in Spiritum sanctum, sanctam ecclesiam 
catholicam . . . ; The Niceno-Constantopolitan Creed: pisteuomen…kai eis to
pneuma to hagion…eis mian hagian katholikƝn kai apostolikƝn ekklesian.
(Credo . . . Et in Spiritum Sanctum . . . Et unam, sanctam, catholicam, et 
apostolicam Ecclesiam.)
14 Wright, Justification, 73. 
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as creation, in and through which our Creator not only promises to give 
us “all that we need to support this body and life,”15 but also to rectify its 
wrongs and to triumph over its evils. Consequently, we either deify or 
objectify God’s creatures—including our fellow human beings—either 
worshipping them and expecting from them that which we can receive 
from God alone, or manipulating them and exploiting them in so far as 
they fall within our powers. Rather than joyfully assuming our God-
given roles as stewards and servants, we seek to possess and dominate. 
We are no longer able to see ourselves as God’s creatures. We have 
forfeited our life as an unconditioned, unmerited gift from God.16 In 
setting aside the justifying word of the Creator, who pronounces us along 
with all that he has made as “very good” (Gen 1:31), and in taking on the 
burden of “knowing [and thus determining] good and evil” (Gen 3:5), we 
must justify ourselves and give meaning to our existence in the midst of 
the chaos and disorder of the fallen creation. We have traded the grace of 
bodily existence in the midst of all created things for the impossible 
burden of self-justification in the midst of vanity, emptiness, and death. 
We have forfeited the glory of God that was ours in thanksgiving and 
praise of our Creator. It has departed from us: Ichabod (Rom 1:23, 3:23) 
“Justification” thus does not merely have to do with our sinfulness, but 
with our creaturely existence, as Oswald Bayer, drawing upon Luther, 
especially has made clear.17 As is already apparent, while the justifying 
event of the cross bears an unmistakably individual dimension, it does 
not further an isolated individualism. Just the opposite: it frees us from it 
by restoring us to a right relation with our Creator and all creatures. 
Conversion, which, despite its decisive beginning includes every day of 
this earthly life, is nothing other than what has sometimes been called a 
“conversion to the world.”18
15 As Luther confesses concerning the first article of the Apostles Creed. 
16 Wright’s insistence that we orbit around God, and not God around us
(Justification, 23-24), is misguided. Naturally, if God is reduced to the 
projection of our desires, Wright’s warning has its point. Nevertheless—and the 
Copernican revolution not withstanding—the wonder of the grace of creation is 
that God causes the sun to shine on us and the rain to fall on us, and that whether 
we are good or evil (Matt 6:45). All appearances to the contrary, all things serve 
us, not, of course, so that they feed our egoistic desires, but so that we find our 
heavenly Father, and as God’s children serve our fellow human beings (Rom 
8:28). The alternative that Wright offers, it seems to me, is a utilitarian God, 
who does not want us so much as he wants what he can get from us. 
17 See Oswald Bayer, Martin Luther’s Theology: A Contemporary 
Interpretation (trans. Thomas H. Trapp; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
2008), 95–119. 
18 Yet not in the sense of a second conversion. 
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This exposure of our guilt, painful though it is, therefore turns out to 
be an advantage (cf. Rom 3:1-2). Just as the law does not create our 
fallen condition, the purposes of God are not exhausted in it. The 
condemning work of the law merely prepares for the word of the gospel: 
where the letter has put to death, the Spirit makes alive; where the law 
has brought condemnation, the gospel brings righteousness (2 Cor 3:4-
11). This twofold work of God is anything other than automatic. As Paul 
himself knew, it is quite possible to be deaf to the voice of the law, to 
regard its fulfillment as first and foremost a matter of performing 
outward deeds, and not a claim upon our whole person and life (Gal 
1:13-14; Phil 3:4-6). It is also possible to hear the condemning voice of 
the law as the last word, and to despair in the face of it, as in the stark 
example of Judas: “I have sinned in betraying innocent blood!” (Matt 
27:4). In either case, whether one lives in superbia or in desperatio, in 
pride or in despair, one lives in one’s self, in isolated self-absorption and 
self-justification.19
Whether pride or despair rules in the heart, the deliverance of the 
human heart comes by a word from without. The law is given and 
therefore comes as a word from without, especially to those who live in
superbia: through Moses, through the prophets, through John the Baptist. 
The gospel, too, comes as a word from without, to those who through the 
law know their guilt, delivering them from despair: according to the 
Gospel narratives Peter is given the Lord’s word of promise, which apart 
from any virtue in Peter brings him forgiveness in his failure: Judas 
hanged himself, but Peter wept. No one comes to the gospel through 
reflection. All of us must be told and repeatedly reminded of the gospel 
by the word and voice of another: fides ex auditu, faith comes by hearing 
(Rom 10:17).20 Consequently, although the forgiveness of sins comes to 
us as individuals, it is no individualistic experience.21 It takes place 
within and through the community where the Gospel is announced. 
Conversely, self-justification necessarily makes use of and exploits 
community—always the community of persons like us—to further its 
own individualistic ends: we seek glory from one another, rather than 
19 Luther repeatedly describes fallen human beings as turned in on 
themselves: cor incurvatus in seipsum. See Bayer, Martin Luther’s 
Theology, 182–4.
20 Admittedly, akoƝ in this context signifies the “the message given for 
hearing,” or proclamation. But the point stands. 
21 See Eberhard Hahn, “Ich glaube . . . die Vergebung der Sünden”: Studien 
zur Wahrnehmung der Vollmacht zur Sündenvergebung durch die Kirche Jesu 
Christi (Forschungen zur systematischen und ökumenischen Theologie 92; 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 46–8. 
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seeking the glory that comes from God alone (cf. John 5:44). In this 
respect, our acknowledgment of guilt and confession of sin is the 
moment of individuation, in which we—like the prodigal son—come to 
ourselves and tell the truth about ourselves in the presence of God: tibi
soli peccavi (“Against you alone I have sinned!”; Ps 51:6).22 At the same 
time, just as the gospel is announced in and through the community of 
forgiven sinners, those who receive the forgiveness of their sins are 
placed within that community. God’s word as law and gospel 
individuates, but it does not isolate.23 As his very words reveal, the older 
son in the parable of the prodigal is after all—in his mind and in heart—
the brother of the younger son.24 Had he turned, he would have 
recognized his brother. We, who are many, are one in Christ (cf. 1 Cor 
12:12-13). God’s justifying work in Christ is the deliverance of our 
persons from the community of manipulation and lies and our transfer to 
the community of forgiven sinners, where the truth is spoken and 
confessed in freedom (Col 1:13-14; Eph 4:4-16). In his concentration on 
the redemption of community, especially as it is expressed in his 
construal of the story of Scripture as Israel’s return from Babylon, 
Wright forgets that the outward evil that expresses itself in the structures 
of this present world has its root in the human heart: 
Our towns are copied fragments from our breast; 
And all man's Babylons strive but to impart 
The grandeurs of his Babylonian heart.25
Rightly understood, therefore, the question, “How can I find a 
gracious God?” is no hindrance to a proper concern for the redemption of 
creation. Quite the opposite: it is the only doorway to it. It is the proper, 
initial response to the reality of guilt that the law exposes in us. In asking 
this question, we ask how we can be set free from all the ways in which 
we exploit others and misuse the Creator’s gifts to us. The psalmist’s 
confession tibi soli peccavi (“Against you alone I have sinned!” [Ps 
51:6]) is no attempt to evade responsibility for harm done to others. It is 
rather a full facing of responsibility: in the presence of God there is no 
room for excuse (cf. Luke 15:18, 21). The question, “How can I find a 
gracious God?” is not the question of the introspective soul, or at least 
22 Bayer, Martin Luther’s Theology, 38. 
23 Ibid., 245. 
24 He thus envies his younger brother’s whoring and wantonness, and 
wishes for a celebration, not with his father, but with his own friends (Luke 
15:29-30).
25 Francis Thompson, “The Heart Sonnet,” 2.12-14.  
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need not be. It is not restricted to the young Luther, nor is it confined to 
the Middle Ages. We find it in the Synoptics—admittedly in a corrupted 
and introverted form that Jesus corrects—on the lips of the rich young 
ruler who asks, “Good Teacher, what must I do to inherit eternal 
life?”(Mark 10:17-22; Matt 19:16-22; Luke 28:18-23).26 If we do not ask 
how we might find a gracious God, it is either because we are content to 
live in the abuse of God’s creatures, or because we imagine in blind 
superbia that we have transcended such failures: “If we say that we have 
no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us” (1 John 1:8). 
Until our final deliverance arrives at the last judgment, the need for the 
forgiveness of sins remains as much a part of our life as our daily bread. 
Granted, in the modern world and especially in the West, there are many 
who do not feel the need to find “a gracious God.” This tendency is not a 
mark of greater sophistication, but of increasing superficiality, as Karl 
Barth observed more than a half-century ago.27 It is largely the result of 
our prosperity and the corresponding loss of the horizon of final 
judgment from our sight. No matter, however, how we try to suppress 
this question, we cannot remove it from our hearts. In our creatureliness 
we cannot sustain our life and our future, and, thus, are bound to have a 
god to whom or to which we look for help and deliverance in all our 
troubles—as Luther profoundly observes.28 The search for a gracious 
God is inherent to us, whether we are aware of it or not. The only 
question is whether we find the true God or place our trust in idols. 
It is in this context that we are to understand the “good works,” 
which contrary to Wright, the Reformation certainly did not “love to 
hate” (p. 117). Whatever aberrations may have been and may still exist in 
Protestant thought, one need only read Luther’s 1520 “Sermon on Good 
Works” to realize how this judgment is fundamentally misguided and 
unfair. Luther and other Reformers by no means rejected “good works;” 
they only offered a sober realism about their place and value.29 The 
human problem is not with the good works to which we are called, but 
26 Along many with others, Wright radically underestimates the 
individualism that had penetrated Jewish life in the time of Jesus, as is reflected, 
for example, in the practice of individual burial in either a wooden coffin or an 
ossuary that came to replace familial burial, and the earlier biblical concept of 
“being gathered to one’s fathers.” See Rachel Hachlili, Jewish Funerary 
Customs, Practices and Rites in the Second Temple Period (JSJSup 94; Leiden 
Boston: E. J. Brill, 2005), 512–4. 
27 Barth, CD IV/1, 531. 
28 See Luther WA 30:132,32-133,8 (Exposition of the First Commandment 
in the Large Catechism). 
29 So, for example, Luther’s “Treatise on Good Works,” LW 44:17-113 = 
WA 6:202-276. 
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with our false estimation of them, the imagination that our works might 
make us pleasing to God, or that they may serve as certain marks of our 
progress and spirituality. We Christians must maintain a healthy 
suspicion about our works. We cannot take them at face value. Even 
when our works seem outwardly good and beneficial to others, they are 
not truly good unless they are done freely and without self-seeking or 
pride. Otherwise we are no longer serving our neighbor, but serving 
ourselves, no matter what the outward appearance might be. If, on the 
other hand, as Wright argues, my standing in the final judgment is 
contingent on my works, I am no longer free to serve my neighbor, but in 
one way or another must and will seek my final justification in my works 
even if I suppose that I accomplish them by the Spirit’s help. I serve 
myself and not my neighbor. Works and faith, faith and faithfulness must 
not be confused with one another. The failure to distinguish between 
them is the death of both. Faith is nothing other than the finding of a 
gracious God in Jesus Christ. With that discovery comes both the 
unmerited justification of my life now and the assurance of that same 
justification at the final judgment. Out of this assurance that in Christ we 
are pleasing to God—and only out of his assurance—we are set free from 
our self-seeking so that we may serve our neighbor. Our works are truly 
good only to the extent that they are done in this faith. These are old, 
reformational insights that should hardly need to be repeated.
III. CREDO IN . . . SANCTORUM COMMUNIONEM 
        As we have repeatedly observed, Wright’s program takes its 
material orientation from his corporate conception of salvation. The 
substitutionary dimension of the saving event, God’s justifying work in 
Christ, as well as Jesus’ individual identity itself are all overlooked or 
given diminished scope while “representation” and membership in the 
people of God are accorded primary and fundamental status. This new 
ordo salutis not only introduces the equivocations and ambiguities that 
we have considered above, it also brings with it a new form of 
individualism—one of which Wright himself seems unaware. As we 
have seen, although for Wright, “justification” establishes our “status” 
within the people of God, the people of God is that community marked 
by the badge of faith(fulness). We must become in “reality” what we are 
by “declaration.”30 As we observed in the first lecture, Wright strangely, 
yet happily embraces the caricature of a divine fiction, of which the 
30 It is reflected in Wright’s illustrative depiction of marriage as a mere 
change of “status” that must be followed by a “steady transformation of the 
heart” (p. 91). Do the two become one only at the end of this transformation? 
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Reformers often have been accused! Of course, Protestant theology is 
well familiar with the call to “become what you are!” This relation, 
however, between the “indicative” and the “imperative,” between what 
God has done and what we must do, is a paradox. We are to take hold of 
that which already has been given and done for us in Christ (cf. Rom 
13:14). In contrast, Wright restricts the effect of justification to a “status” 
that must be followed by an “actual rescue” in order for us to stand at 
judgment, so that our “status” seems to be nothing other than a legal 
fiction. As we again have repeatedly observed, he dissolves the biblical 
paradox and assigns final significance to a moral ideal. As a result, the 
gap between us and Jesus necessarily becomes a gap between us and 
others. The inevitable differences between Christians in virtue, godliness, 
and outward standing take on fundamental significance. All of those who 
have “the faith of Jesus” are human, but some of us are more human than 
others. As we have seen in the first lecture, that is clearly the case with 
the apostle Paul over against the Corinthians according to Wright’s own 
reading of 2 Cor 5:21 (pp. 162-165), even if Wright would be unwilling 
to admit it. Ironically, with Wright an absolute and, therefore, destructive 
individualism takes the place of the biblical form. Within the Scriptures, 
our individual differences are limited by the unqualified character of our 
very existence as a gift (1 Cor 4:7), by our standing as sinners coram
Deo (the ground is level at the foot of the cross) and by the oneness in 
Christ that transcends all earthly differences and outward marks of 
spirituality (Gal 3:28). The opponents of Paul in Galatia were seeking by 
the grace of God, through Christ, to build a single humanity marked by 
faithfulness, a faithfulness in which outward progress was the measure of 
spirituality (cf. Gal 1:14; Luke 18:11). Shall we follow their example? 
Rightly understood, the message of justification encompasses the 
whole of Christian existence. The forgiveness of sins is not merely the 
entry point into the Church, as Wright imagines, but that which makes its 
corporate life realistic and vital. Justification is not merely a matter of a 
personal relationship with God, it is the presence of the new creation in 
the midst of the fallen world that opens the world to us afresh as creation 
in its dynamic life of receiving and giving.31 The forgiveness of sins and 
the free justification of our existence, grounded in the first and last word 
of the Creator, sets us free from the reality of our guilt as well as from 
our sense of shame and inward need to justify ourselves. Through it we 
are set free to serve our neighbor with all that we are and have. That 
freedom includes the freedom of forgiveness. As the Lord’s Prayer 
31 See Oswald Bayer, “Ethik der Gabe” (paper presented at Die Gave-ein 
‘Urwort’ der Theologie? Ein systematisch-theologisches Symposion; Katholisch 
soziale Akademie, Münster, 5 April 2008). 
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teaches us, forgiveness truly received, necessarily goes forth to others: 
“forgive us our debts, as we have forgiven our debtors” (Matt 6:12).32
The entire dynamic of the common life of the disciples appears here, 
since the fifth petition presupposes that disciples who have received the 
forgiveness of their sins and have already given it forth to others, must 
themselves come again and again to receive it afresh from God (cf. Matt 
18:21-35). The Christian community, in both its vertical and horizontal 
dimensions, exists in the constant receiving and giving of the forgiveness 
of sins. Jesus’ disciples love one another as he has loved them not only in 
the sharing of material goods, but also in washing one another’s feet 
(John 13:12-17).33 It is only through this vehicle of forgiveness received 
and given forth that “the glory of God returns to the (fallen) world” and 
that the world and those who dwell in it receive healing.34 No measure of 
material progress or sharing of earthly goods can remove the need for 
this healing. What would it have profited the paralytic of the Gospel 
story to have received the power to walk, but not the forgiveness of his 
sins? As Miroslav Volf has argued, final judgment itself includes the 
mutual justification and reconciliation of all God’s people with one 
another—as it must so long as the fifth petition of Lord’s Prayer still 
addresses us.35
This matter of forgiveness touches upon a fundamental concern of 
the “new perspective” and of Wright in particular. The giving and 
receiving of forgiveness entails receiving one another as forgiven and 
justified sinners in Jesus Christ, apart from all outward differences—
differences which invariably are mistaken as marks of faithfulness and 
piety. When believing Jews accepted believing Gentiles in the earliest 
Church, they confessed that they themselves were and remained nothing 
more than justified sinners alongside their Gentile brothers and sisters 
(Gal 2:15-21). When, later in Rome, Paul called upon believing Gentiles 
to accept those Jewish believers in the Messiah who retained their 
32 Luther likewise understands the “blessed exchange” between Christ and 
the believer to overflow into the life of the church, so that, “the virgin must 
place her crown on the harlot, a faithful wife must place her veil over an 
adulteress” (WA 10.3, 217,11-218,16). 
33 Miroslav Volf recounts powerful examples from the experiences of his 
own family. See M. Volf, Free of Charge: Giving and Forgiving in a Culture 
Stripped of Grace (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2005) 121–6. 
34 See Cristoph Gestrich, The Return of Splendor in the World: The 
Christian Doctrine of Sin and Forgiveness (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1997), 14–35, 263–337. 
35 See M. Volf, “The Final Reconciliation: Reflections On A Social 
Dimension of the Eschatological Transition,” Modern Theology 16.1 
(2000): 91–113.
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conservative “boundary markers,” he was calling them to the same 
confession (Rom 15:1-6). Indeed, this changing call to the accepting 
embrace of the other flows out of the dynamic of God’s dealings with 
humanity, according to which God shuts up first one and then the other 
under disobedience, so that he might have mercy on all (Rom 11:28-36). 
In this way, God’s justifying work in Christ remains integral and vital to 
the building up of the body of Christ. As the Scriptures make clear, this 
dynamic of exchange is not new, but was always part of Israel’s history. 
God’s choice to bless the world through Abraham in no way does away 
with the regular, and yet ever-surprising reversal of roles: Melchizedek is 
greater than Abraham, Pharaoh, and Abimelech more pious than he; 
Ruth, the Moabite, is the model of hesed; Job, the Gentile, the model of 
patience; the pagan Cyrus is the Lord’s messiah; the name of the Lord of 
which Israel is weary “is great among the nations” where incense rises 
and pure offering is made (Mal 1:11). Israel’s role in the world is not that 
of a moral beacon, but that of the object and model of the forgiving grace 
of its Lord. The same is true of and within the Church, as already 
becomes clear in the book of Acts. The sanctorum communio is not 
visible in its outward works, but must be confessed in faith. Its 
fellowship does not consist in an outward badge or emblem—God save 
us from such saints!36—but in the crucified and risen Lord who is its 
righteousness, from whom it continues to receive the forgiveness of its 
sins, through which forgiveness it makes its progress. In this respect, 
more than all the others we have considered, Wright has not succeeded in 
communicating the apostolic vision of God’s justifying work in Christ. 
36 See Luther WA 46:583,10-17. 
